Politics prediction markets
Elections, policy, and geopolitics priced across every major prediction market — compared side by side with the cross-venue PredictPal Consensus.
1,058 markets · page 2 of 45
Elections, policy, and geopolitics priced across every major prediction market — compared side by side with the cross-venue PredictPal Consensus.
1,058 markets · page 2 of 45
Yes ≈ 4% chance
The market is virtually certain Epstein is dead, betting that persistent viral rumors and inconclusive video logs will never be backed by credible evidence, despite the official narrative having unresolved contradictions.
Yes ≈ 2% chance
The market is pricing a slight majority chance of a major US political crisis before 2027, but the recent headlines focus on foreign crises and non-political domestic changes, not on US political instability itself, suggesting the odds may be driven by a general sense of global turmoil rather than specific US triggers.
Yes ≈ 54% chance
22 outcomes
Yes ≈ 29% chance
Zelensky's explicit offer to sign a peace deal in Washington or Mar-a-Lago (Kyiv Post, Jul 25) has shifted the narrative from whether talks can happen to where and when, but the 77% No odds reflect deep skepticism that Russia will accept terms Kyiv and the US can agree on.
Yes ≈ 24% chance
The market heavily favors Trump keeping his hair, but the recent headlines are a distraction—they all involve bald eagles, not Trump's hair, and none provide new evidence about his actual baldness risk. The real story is that the odds are driven by the absence of any credible catalyst for a sudden change, not by any new information about Trump's hair.
Yes ≈ 17% chance
Despite intense political battles over Iran and internal GOP friction, the market sees virtually no chance of Trump leaving office early because no removal mechanism—impeachment, 25th Amendment, or resignation—has been seriously activated, and the historical precedent is nearly zero.
Yes ≈ 7% chance
Yes ≈ 11% chance
The market has resolved to 100% Yes, meaning a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal before 2027 is now priced as a certainty—but the recent headlines focus entirely on a U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement and regional proliferation, not on U.S.-Iran negotiations, so the real story is whether the market is conflating related Saudi developments with a direct Iran deal or has information not yet publicly known.
Yes ≈ 100% chance
The market sees virtually no chance of Marco Rubio becoming president of Cuba before 2029, despite his active role in pushing for regime change and U.S. military action, because the path to him holding that office requires a complete collapse of the Cuban government and a U.S.-backed transition that has no clear legal or political mechanism.
Yes ≈ 1% chance
Yes ≈ 12% chance
Yes ≈ 22% chance
The market has already resolved to 100% because repeated clashes—including water cannon and physical confrontations—escalated into what the consensus treats as a military clash, making further debate moot.
Yes ≈ 100% chance
The market sees a Trump pardon for Luigi Mangione as extremely unlikely (1%), reflecting that Mangione's case—a CEO murder—lacks the political alignment of January 6 defendants, and plea talks have collapsed, pushing him toward trial rather than clemency.
Yes ≈ 1% chance
30 outcomes
Yes ≈ 9% chance
The market sees an Iran nuclear deal before 2027 as highly unlikely, reflecting deep diplomatic stalemates and regional tensions rather than a specific new trigger.
Yes ≈ 5% chance
Buttigieg's repeated emphasis on the 2026 midterms and his willingness to engage with Trump's hypothetical advice suggest he is not positioning for an early 2028 announcement, keeping the 'Yes' probability low despite strong early primary poll numbers.
Yes ≈ 11% chance
The market sees a stock-trading ban for Congress as unlikely before 2027 despite bipartisan rhetoric, because past reform pushes have stalled and the current odds reflect skepticism that any bill can clear both chambers and a presidential signature in the remaining legislative window.
Yes ≈ 21% chance
The market sees a military clash between China and Japan before 2027 as highly unlikely, despite recent provocative Chinese military tests and a historical document revealing past contingency planning, because the odds remain anchored at 8% Yes, suggesting traders view these as posturing rather than imminent escalation.
Yes ≈ 8% chance
Yes ≈ 7% chance
Yes ≈ 23% chance