Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through July 22?
🗂 Part of event: Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through...? →The Israel-Iran ceasefire held through July 22, 2026, despite concurrent U.S.-Iran hostilities and a history of brinkmanship, as neither side launched a qualifying air or missile strike during the period.
📊 Base rate: Omitted – no defensible historical base rate for this specific bilateral ceasefire framework is available from the provided data.
What's driving it
- • Iran's secret proposal for a 10-day ceasefire, submitted while under intense U.S. strikes (Jerusalem Post, Jul 21), signaled a willingness to de-escalate with Israel even as broader regional tensions boiled.
- • The U.S. blockaded Iranian ports and launched strikes on July 15 (CBS News, Jul 15), but those actions were not directed by Israel, making them non-qualifying under the market's definition.
- • The 24-point jump in Yes probability over the past 7 days reflected growing confidence that the ceasefire would hold as the July 22 deadline approached without any cross-border Israeli–Iranian military action.
The case for YES
- • Neither Israel nor Iran reported any air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike against the other from market creation through July 22, directly satisfying the resolution criteria.
- • Iran's secret ceasefire proposal (Jerusalem Post, Jul 21) suggests that Tehran was actively seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with Israel during this window.
- • The U.S. military engagement with Iran (July 15 strikes and blockade) did not involve Israeli forces, and no retaliatory actions by Iran against Israel were documented.
The case for NO
- • The U.S. strikes on Iranian ports and blockade (CBS News, Jul 15) could have escalated into direct Israel–Iran exchanges if Iran had retaliated against Israel, but that did not occur.
- • Iran's insistence on controlling the Strait of Hormuz (Radio Free Europe, Jul 22) kept tensions high, but the rhetoric did not translate into a qualifying military action against Israel.
- • A hypothetical false alarm or misattributed strike could have broken the ceasefire, but no such event materialized.
What to watch
- • No future catalysts apply because the market's resolution date (July 22) has already passed; the outcome is known.
AI-generated · grounded in recent news + odds · informational only, not advice. Verify on the source platform.
Data from Polymarket’s public API, for informational purposes only. PredictPal is not affiliated with any platform and does not facilitate trading.
Discussion
Loading…
How it resolves
Settled on-chain by UMA's optimistic oracle: once an outcome is clear, anyone can propose the result, which then enters a challenge window where it can be disputed with evidence before it finalizes.
⚖️ A proposed outcome can be disputed during a challenge window before it's final.
Resolution criteria
This market will resolve to "Yes" if a state of ceasefire remains in effect between Israel and Iran through the listed date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time (IRST). Otherwise this market will resolve to “No”. A state of ceasefire will be considered to no longer be in effect between Israel and Iran if either Israel or Iran takes a qualifying military action against the other country between market creation and the listed date, 11:59 PM IRST. A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Israel or Iran, that directly impacts the other country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Israel or Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. A military action will be considered to impact Israel or Iran if it directly impacts the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran, including any internal waters. Maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of the relevant state as of market creation will qualify. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (IRST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. If, at the end of the third calendar day, conflicting reports remain as to the occurrence, attribution, or timing of the action, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Israel and Iran and credible reporting.
Related markets
Democratic Presidential Nominee 2028
The field is virtually nonexistent: only two candidates register at 1% each, and no one has broken 5%, making this the most open Democratic nomination race in modern history. The single biggest recent shift is the DNC's decision to put South Carolina first in the 2028 primary calendar (Axios, Jul 25), which could reshape candidate strategies and favor a different type of contender.
2 outcomes
Next General Election - Most Seats
The field is moderately concentrated with Labour leading at 36%, but Reform UK and Conservative are close; the biggest recent shift is Reform UK overtaking the Conservatives for second place, as seen in the stated odds, though no headline directly explains this.
9 outcomes
Will Trump announce he is running for President in the 2028 election?
Yes ≈ 64% chance
Republican Presidential Nominee 2028
The Republican nomination field is exceptionally fragmented, with no candidate above 5% and the top three sum to just 1% — a sign that the race is truly wide open and still in its earliest jockeying phase, despite a recent poll placing Senator JD Vance near the top of a generic primary ballot (USA Today, Jul 23).
2 outcomes
Democratic Presidential Nominee 2028
Despite Newsom's commanding lead, the field is far from settled: the 20% 'Other' share and AOC/Ossoff's recent gains per Action Network (Jul 8) suggest a pool of anti-Newsom sentiment waiting for a viable alternative.
8 outcomes