Will a ≤5% Uranium Enrichment Cap (1+ Year) be in a US-Iran deal in 2026?
🗂 Part of event: What will be in a US-Iran deal in 2026? →💡 What the odds say
The market puts this at about a 29% chance — unlikely.
No money — just record your call and see if you were right. Yes is at 29% right now.
Data from Polymarket’s public API, for informational purposes only. PredictPal is not affiliated with any platform and does not facilitate trading.
Discussion
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How it resolves
Settled on-chain by UMA's optimistic oracle: once an outcome is clear, anyone can propose the result, which then enters a challenge window where it can be disputed with evidence before it finalizes.
⚖️ A proposed outcome can be disputed during a challenge window before it's final.
Resolution criteria
This market resolves to “Yes” if a written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran that establishes a percentage cap of 5% or less on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, committed to for at least one year, has been mutually signed or otherwise formally adopted by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” The instrument must specifically include a 5% or lower percentage cap that operates as a general ceiling on the level to which Iran may enrich uranium for any purpose. Vague, or non-specific language regarding the level of Iranian uranium enrichment which does not establish a specific percentage cap on all Iranian enrichment (e.g., “lower levels”, “civilian grade”, “maintain the status quo”) will not qualify. Caps which directly mandate a precise 5% or lower percentage cap on Iranian enrichment through reference to a publicly-recognized benchmark percentage (e.g., JCPOA-levels), however, will qualify, even if they do not specifically reference the relevant numeric percentage itself. An Iranian commitment to end all enrichment of uranium qualifies as a cap, as it establishes a 0% cap on Iranian uranium enrichment. A qualifying enrichment cap must be committed for a period of at least one year. A permanent enrichment cap will qualify. An enrichment cap with no specified end date will qualify unless explicitly framed as short-term, provisional, or temporary (e.g., a commitment not to enrich uranium while the exact implementation terms of the instrument are being finalized would not qualify). A cap committed to for less than one year will not qualify, even if framed as permitting extension. The enrichment cap must be expressed as a presently-agreed obligation to be implemented. A presently-agreed obligation to such an enrichment cap will qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the implementation schedule or specific monitoring requirements, remain subject to future arrangements. A conditional commitment the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument (e.g., a commitment to agree upon an enrichment cap in a future agreement) will not qualify. A commitment explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation, will not qualify. Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies. An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.
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